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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE
HAROLD SHEPHERD AND KENNETH SEARS, EDS.
ACCOMPLICE
State v. Sweeney, Minn., 231 N. W. 225. One giving a bribe not an ac-
complice of one receiving bribe.
Defendant was charged with accepting a bribe to influence his vote as
an alderman of the city of Minneapolis. His conviction depended principally
upon the testimony of another alderman, Mauer, from whom he was charged
with accepting the bribe. Gen. St. 1923, par. 9903, prohibits conviction upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Held, the giver of a bribe is
not an accomplice of the receiver within the meaning of this statute and hence
the receiver's conviction may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of the
giver.
ENDEAVOR
State v Hudon, Vt., 151 Atlantic 562. Statute making it a crime to endeavor
to indte another to commzit felony does not require physical action. "Endeavor-
ing" distinguished from "Attempt."
Sec. 7123 of the General Laws provides that a person who endeavors to
incite, procure or hire another to commit a felony, though a felony is not actu-
ally committed, shall be imprisoned, etc. After conviction under this statute
for endeavoring to incite one to burn a barn with intent to defraud an insurance
company, defendant contended that the conviction was erroneous because the
information did not allege that the barn was burned or that there was an
attempt to burn it. The court, while freely conceding that in order to make out
the crime of "attempt" there must be some act done in part execution of the
design to commit another crime, sharply distinguishes the new offense created
by the statute which requires neither the commission of the main crime nor
any act toward it necessary to make out an attempt. The statute has created
an entirely new offense.
HOMICIDE
State v. Flatners, S. D., 232 N. W. 51. Conviction of murder upheld under
instructions permitting verdict of guilty even though some of the jury believed
intent was to kill deceased and others that intent was to kill deceased's companion.
The first count of the information charged defendant with shooting and
killing deceased with a premeditated design to effect his death; the second count
charged his killing with premeditated intent to cause the death of deceased's
companion, Doris Rounds. On appeal from conviction, defendant urged that
instructions permitting a verdict of guilty even though some of the jurors be-
lieved the intent was to kill Doris Rounds, constituted reversible error. Held,
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there was no error. Since, to constitute the crime of murder it is only neces-
sary that there-be intent to kill a human being, the finding of such intent is
sufficient. That some of the jurors found the intent was to kill deceased and
others that it was fo kill deceased's companion is immaterial. The decision
seems s6und.
INSANITY
Ex parte Merzin, Cal., 290 Pac. 1076. Under California statute providing
for pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity," a verdict of
guilty followed by finding "not-guilty by reason of insanity," is not a "conviction"
within meaning of statute providing for appeals by the state.
Defendant, to a charge of murder, entered the two pleas allowed by Cal.
P. C. 1016, "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity." Under the first
he was found guilty of murder in the second degree. Under the second, he was
found "not guilty by reason of insanity." After confinement in the hospital
for the insane for more than a year, he was released on habeas corpus on a
finding that he was then sane. Sec. 1506 of the Penal Code provides for
appeals by the state in orders of habeas corpus discharging a defendant in
criminal cases after a conviction. In an appeal by the state from the order
discharging the defendant, held that hearings on the two pleas provided for by
see. 1016 constituted but one trial and there was therefore, no "conviction"
within the meaning of sec. 1506. Appeal dismissed. The decision in the prin-
cipal case is consistent with the construction formerly given to the California
statutes regulating the pleas in insanity cases by the Supreme Court in People v.
Leong Fook, 206 Cal. 64, 70, 273 Pac. 779, 782, and People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35,
48, 273 Pac. 767, 772.
Jessner v. State, Wisc., 231 N. W. 634. Statute providing for appointmeni
of expert witnesses by the court and for examination and observation by them of
defendants in criminal cases held constitutional.
In a well reasoned and considered opinion, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
in the principal case, sustained the Wisconsin statute providing in criminal cases
for the appointment of expert witnesses by the court empowered to make scien-
tific examinations and observations of the accused. The significance of the
decision is well indicated by the language of the court: "The assault thus
made upon this statute is highly important. Its enactment was in response to a
well settled conviction, that, in criminal cases at least, where the interests of
society were involved, there should be some technical evidence from unprejudiced
and reliable sources. This conviction grew out of the belief that under the then
existing procedure there was a striking tendency on the part of experts to accom-
modate their opinions to the necessities of that side of the case upon which they
were testifying, and that such opinions were to a very large extent prejudicial
and unreliable. To secure the reliable and unprejudiced opinions of the ablest
experts in such cases, to the end that the purest degree of justice might be pro-
moted, the board of circuit judges sponsored the enactment of this statute. If
this statute must be condemned as unconstitutional, it will require retractment
of most significant forward steps in judicial procedure, and bring regret to all
who believe in steady progress towards the attainment of a more perfect justice."
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The important provisions of the statute challenged as violating the consti-
tutional rights of defendants in criminal cases are as follows: "'Whenever in
any criminal case, expert evidence becomes necessary or desirable the judge of
the trial court may after notice to the parties and a hearing, appoint one or
more disinterested qualified experts, not exceeding three, to testify at the trial.
. . . The fact that such expert witnesses have been appointed by the court
shall be made known to the jury, but they shall be subject to cross examination
by both parties, who may also summon other expert witnesses at the trial ...
No testimony regarding the mental condition of the accused shall be received
from witnesses summoned by the accused until the expert witnesses summoned
by the prosecution have been given an opportunity to examine and observe the
accused. . . Whenever the existence of mental disease on the part of the
accused . . . becomes the subject of inquiry, the presiding judge of the
court . . may . . commit the accused to a . . . hospital for the
insane to be detained there for a reasonable time to be fixed by the court for
the purpose of observation. . . . In case of commitment to a hospital the
court shall direct the superintendent of the hospital to permit all the expert
witnesses summoned in the case to have free access to the accused for the
purpose of observation." It was first contended that this statute violated the
constitution prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination. In answer to this the
state had argued that the question of mental responsibility was a separate and
distinct issue from the question of whether the act denounced had been com-
mitted and that the constitutional guarantees in question related only to the
latter. The court, however, preferred to rest its decision in favor of constitu-
tionality upon the ground that the statute should be construed only as per-
mitting those kinds of examination and identification sanctioned by law without
attempting to set the limits for all cases. It was enough that no claim of specific
violations were claimed in this case. The second assault on the statute was
made on the ground that since the appointment of the experts by the court was
made known to the jury this necessarily gave a weight to their testimony not
accorded to other witnesses and amounted to an expression by the judge of the
weight that should be given to their testimony thereby infringing on the function
of the jury and violating the constitutional right to jury trial. The court's
answer is highly significant. The doctrine that the trial judge cannot in any
way express an opinion on the evidence or merits of the case is a doctrine of
modern American jurisprudence but "neither statutes enacted nor judicial opin-
ions rendered since the adoption of the Constitution can impute a different
meaning to the constitutional provision than that obviously intended at the
time the Constitution was adopted." The court then points out that the only
limitation the common law knew was that the judge should make it clear to the
jury that they were not bound by his opinion. "It is common legal knowledge
that at the present time in all of the federal courts as well as many of the state
courts and in the courts of England the trial judge freely discusses the evi-
dence, pointing out the weakness and the strength thereof, and, if he feels so
disposed, expresses his own opinion . . ." "Whether the sponsoring of any
witness by the court is good public policy is no longer a matter of judicial
opinion. The dominant opinion of the legislature upon that subject has re-
ceived expression and . . . its expression . . . prevails unless it con-
travenes constitutional provisions" As to the contention that the statute im-
posed the non-judicial function of appointing experts on the court and was
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therefore unconstitutional the court said: "The function of these experts is to
aid in the administration of justice by furnishing reliable and unprejudiced
opinions upon a technical subject. The whole purpose of their creation and
appointment is to promote the accomplishment of the very purposes for which
courts are established. . . . For the purposes of that iarticular trial they are
a part of the machinery of the court. They render assistance to the court.
. . . Their appointment is a most appropriate judicial function."
State v. Burris (1930) 125 So. (La.) 580. *Statute providing for a com-
mission to eramine defendant who pleads insanity.
Defendant, Burris, was indicted for murder. He filed pleas that he was
insane at the present time and also that he was insane at the time of the com-
mission of the crime. He also asked for the appointment of a commission to
inquire as to his sanity under the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of
Louisiana. The court appointed the superintendent of the hoipital for the
insane at Jackson. He was unable to act and, as authorized by statute, he
appointed in his place a well-known alienist. The court also appointed the
superintendent of the hospital for the insane at Pineville and the coroner of a
certain parish. The commission made an examination and listened to testimony.
They made a report that in their opinion the defendant was insane and irre-
sponsible at the time of the commission of thq offense charged against him,
but that he was sane at the present time. One member of the commission
dissented from this report.
After this report was made, the defendant asked the district court to make
an order sending him to the East Louisiana H:ospital for the insane at Jackson.
This motion was refused. Then the defendant asked the district court to order
the district attorney to show cause why the defendant should not be discharged
as a sane persom The district court refused this motion and declared its
intention to hold the defendant for trial by jury on the question of his guilt
or innocence with permission to the defendant to urge the defense of insanity.
Thereupon the defendant, Burris, applied for a writ of certiorari, prohibi-
tion and mandamus to review the rulings of the district court. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana with O'Neill, C. J., dissenting, decided that the judge of the
district court must grant an order committing the defendant, Burris, to the
criminal ward in the hospital for the insane at Jackson to* be there kept until
discharged as provided by law.
The action of the district judge was based upon his belief that the Louisiana
statute was in violation of the constitution of. Louisiana for several reasons,
the most important of which was the constitutional provision guaranteeing a
trial by jury. The Louisiana statute provided that if the report of the com-
mission of lunacy be "that the accused is presently insane, or was insane at the
time of the commission of the crime, he shall forthwith be committed to the
criminal ward of a hospital for the insane there to remain until discharged in
due course of law. But if the report be that the accused is presently sane and
was sane at the time of the commission of the crime the trial of the plea of
insanity shall be proceeded with . .
The majority of the Supreme Court of Louisiana gave the law, part of
which only has been quoted, this interpretation: "The general theory of
these provisions, which is carefully worked out, is that the state cannot contest
the correctness of the report of the commission, while, upon the other hand
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
an adverse report of the commission is never binding upon the accused, but the
correctness of the report is, in effect, tested before the judge sitting with or
without a jury, according as to how the indictment itself is triable."
With that interpretation the problem before the court was whether the law
was unconstitutional where a defendant is not denied a trial by jury but merely
the prosecution is denied the privilege of insisting upon a jury to determine the
question of insanity. As stated by the court: "It is true that the state is not
given, when the report of the commission is adverse to it, a trial by jury, but
the constitution guarantees no right of trial by jury to the state."
Then the question arose by what authority may a court commit to a hos-
pital for the insane a person who has been reported to be presently sane. The
court replied that the theory of the law was that a person who was insane at
the time that he committed a homicide thoutgh now sane should be kept under
observation until it appeared that there was no reasonable danger of the recur-
rence of his insanity.
The attitude of the dissenting judge was that under the constitution a jury
alone must decide all questions of fact on which depend the guilt or innocence
of the defendant and that insanity is a question upon which depends the guilt
or innocence.
The decision was reviewed in 78 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
909. It seems necessary to state, however, that the review is unsatisfactory.
Indeed, the author of the review did not state correctly the proposition involved
in the case. He said: "Under the statute, it was for the court to decide whether
such person (should) be committed to the insane asylum. Held, inter alia, that
the action of the court in sending such person to an insane asylum was justified
and that defendant could be confined for a reasonable time." It is submitted
that this' statement is wholly misleading.
I1SURREMON AND SEDITION
People v. Mintz et al., Cal., 290 Pac. 93. Conviction under California statute
prohibiting display of a red flag as an aid to propaganda that is of seditious
ciharacter, sustained.
Sec. 403a, of the Penal Code provides (inter alia) "Any person who dis-
plays a red flag, . . . in any meeting place . . . as an aid to propaganda
that is of a seditious character is guilty of a felony." Defendant, who was
charged in one count of the information with this offense, was a member of
an organization known as the Pioneer Summer Camp Conference. The follow-
ing extracts from the opinion indicate the nature of the organization and its
activities. The association was, "composed of independent organizations, some
of which were communistic in character, the others having members who were
communists. The purpose for which the camp conference was organized was
to establish a summer camp for children of the so-called "working classes."
Grounds for the camp were based in the hills of San Bernardino County, and it
was established with the gathering together there of a number of children
under . . . the leadership . . . of the defendant. . . . In the conduct
of the daily camp program, the first order was that the children, when they
arose about 6:30 in the morning, stood by their cots and saluted a red flag on
which was a device of sickle and hammer, and announced themselves "ready"
This flag raising ceremony was under the direction of the defendant. The
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flag used was shown to be the flag of the Communist Party, and of the "Third
International," with which the party was affiliated, and of the "Soviet Govern-
ment of Russia." The pledge which the children were instructed to take was
as follows: "I pledge allegiance to the worker's red flag, and to the cause for
which it stands, one aim through-out our lives, freedom for the working
class." Excerpts from books and pamphlets in the camp library were admitted
in evidence among which was one as follows: "Communists do not think it
necessary to conceal their views and intentions. They openly declare that their
goal can be achieved only by the violent overthrow of the whole of the present
social system." The District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District speaking
through Mr. Justice Strothers, Marks J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part, held that the statute was constitutional and the evidence sustained the
conviction.
JURY
Patton et al v. U. S. (1929) 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 253. Under federal procedure
trial by jury of eleven.
A conviction of felony was rendered in the cose by a jury of eleven men.
A jury of twelve was duly impaneled but before the trial was concluded one
juror, because of severe illness, could serve no longer. Thereupon, it was stipu-
lated by counsel for the government and for the defendants, and by the defendants
in person, that the trial should proceed with the remaining- eleven jurors. Upon
-a conviction being obtained, the defendants, as might have been expected,
immediately complained that they had been denied their constitutional right of
trial by jury under article III, section 2, clause 3, and under the sixth amendment
of the federal constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion
rendered by Mr. Justice Sutherland, with Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice
Brandeis, and M~4r. Justice Stone' concurring in the result, and with the Chief
Justice taking no part in the decision, held that the conviction was proper, and
that the accused could waive trial by jury. The court said that the problem
was the same as if there had been a trial before the court without any jury
whatsoever. This is important because it settles what was doubtful in the
federal law and because it is contrary to a number of state decisions which
have taken the view that the constitutional right of trial by jury is so important
from the viewpoint of the public interest in defendants that it could not be
waived. The decision has been reviewed in 44 Harvard Law Review 124. See
Hall's Cases on Constitutional Law, p. 196; 24 Ill. L. Rev. 339.
:People ex rel Swanson v. Fisher (1930) 172 N. E. (II.) 722. Waiver ofjury trial.
The decision in Patton et at v. U. S. formed the basis of the decisiofi in
this case. The Supreme Court of Illinois in an unanimous opinion held that
under the constitution of Illinois a jury could be waived and a trial in the
case of a felony properly could be had before a trial judge with the consent
of the defendant. The opinion is a well considered one, and is particularly




'McBoyle v U. S. (1930) 43" Fed. (2d) 273. NatiomrJ Motor Vehicle Theft
Act.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit has held that an airplane
is included in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act which provides as follows:
"The term 'motor vehicle' when used in this section shall include an automobile,
automobile truck, automobile wagon, niotorcycle, or any other self-propelled
vehicle not designed for running on rails." The majority of the court resorted
to dictionaries and determined that the term "vehicle" included a ship, and thus
concluded that an airplane was within the statutory definition. Cotteral, C. J.,
dissented. He relied upon the rule that: "A penal statute is to be construed
strictly against an offender .... " It would seem that this rule would be better
expressed if the wording was that a penal statute is to be construed strictly in
favor of an offender. In any event, the rule has been overworked and it is
doubtful whether a court should approach a criminal statute from any other
viewpoint than an honest attempt to ascertain the meaning of the legislature.
JU'dge Cotteral also relied upon the rule of ejusdem generis and it seems fair
to concede that he made a good argument on this point. However, no rule of
statutory construction seems to be more than a guide post toward the end
of ascertaining the legislative intention. Accordingly, it would seem as if the
majority opinion is a more useful one and probably expressed the legislative
intent, if indeed Congress had any thought upon the particular subject matter.
PLEADING
Pepple V. State (1930) 172 N. E. (Ind.) 902. Formal requirements of
affdavit.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, Martin, J., dissenting, has rendered a
decision with reference to the formal requirements of an affidavit by which a
prosecution was instituted. A statute in Indiana forbade anyone to feloniously
take an automobile which was operated by electricity, or steam, or explosive
power. The affidavit merely alleged that the appellant "unlawfullyl and felon-
iously took and drove away an automobile, the property of another, without
the owner's consent." The affidavit failed to allege that the automobile so taken
was operated by electricity, or steam, or explosive power. This was held to be
a fatal defect and conviction was reversed. The court refused to take judicial
notice that there is no such thing as an automobile that is not operated by
means of one of the three mentioned methods. This seems unnecessarily rigid
and the result is unfortunate.
People v. Bogdanoff et al (1930) 171 N. E. (N. Y.) 891. New York Indict-
ment Law.
A grand jury indicted the defendants for "murder in the first degree con-
trary to Penal Law, section 1044" The indictment in this form complied with
section 295d of the Code of Criminal Procedure, chapter 176 of the Lawg of
1929. Such an indictment is startlingly simple, and marks probably the extreme
limit of reform in this direction. The district attorney filed a bill of particulars
which stated merely that the defendants by name "on the 27th day of July,
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1929, at the City of Buffalo in this county killed Ferdinand Fechtee by shooting
him." The conviction of first degree murder was affirmed by the New York
Court of Appeals by a four to three opinion. The majority opinion was written
by Lehman, J., and concurred in by Cardozo, C. J., Pound and O'Brien, JJ.
Crane, J., dissented'in an opinion in which Kellogg and Hubbs, JJ., concurred.
The result places New York in a most progressive position. This should be
contrasted with the recent decision in Indiana in Pepple v. State, supra. The
majority of the court was careful to say that, such a brief indictment might
not be sufficient in all cases. The minority objected that the New York law was
even more advanced than' the procedure in England which has received so many
praises.
PREsuMPIoNs
State v. Gardner, Conn., 151 Atl. 349. Presumption of innocence in criminal
trials has no weight as evidence and is adequately covered by instructions deal.-
ing with the burden of proof.
In -a criminal prosecution for libel, the defendant assigned as error the
failure of the trial judge to charge the jury on the presumption of innocence.
The court had, however, repeatedly charged that the burden was upon the state
to prove the material and essential elements oJf the crime charged. The court
said: "An explanation of the presumption of innocence has a proper place in a
charge in a criminal case and should ordinarily be given, but, in the absence
of requests to charge, and where the court charges the jury that the burden is
upon the state to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the
failure of the court to charge upon the presumption of innocence is not
reversible error." That the so-called "presumption of innocence" is not eviden-
tiary in character seems clear. See discussion of this problem in a note to
Barker v. State, Ala., 103 So. 911 in 16 Journal of Criminal Law 457, and that
it is properly covered by adequate instructions on the burderi of proof seems
equally clear. See note to Barker v. State, supra.
PROBATION
People v. Baum, Mich., 231 N. W. 95. Sentence banishing accused fronh
state for, period of probation held void as unauthorized and contrary to publid
policy.
Defendant was convicted of a violation of the liquor laws and sentenced to
pay a fine of $500 and costs. In addition a five years probationary period was
imposed and "defendant must leave the state of Michigan within 30 days and
not return for the period of probation." The court held that banishment from
the state was not cruel and unusual punishment within the constitutional pro-
hibitions, citing the common instances of such practice both in England and the
United States' where the nationals of foreign countries are deported as a
method of punishment for crimes against the United States. But, "to permit
one state to dump its convict criminals into another would . . . tend to incite
dissension, provoke retaliation and disturb that fundamental equality of political
-rights among the several states which is the basis of the Union itself. Such
a method of punishment .... is impliedly prohibited by public policy." See com-
ment on the principal case in 30 Col. Law Review 1057.
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SENTENCE
-Hickman v. Fenton, Neb., 231 N. W. 510. Effect of penitentiary sentence
for less than minimum term prescribed by statute.
Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of incest and was sentenced to the
penitientiary for a term of not less than three nor more than five years. The
minimum sentence for the offence prescribed by statute was twenty years.
After some days imprisonment under the sentence imposed, prisoner was again
taken before the trial court, the original sentence wa. vacated and he was re-
sentenced to a term of twenty-five years. He was then taken to the penitentiary,
held under the original sentence until that term expired and then was detained
under the mittimus issued pursuant to the second sentence. He now seeks his
liberty on habeas corpus. Held, the prisoner should be discharged. The court
concedes the power to vacate a sentence in two cases, where the original sentence
was void and where the defendant himself has invoked appellate jurisdiction
for the correction of errors. Neither was present here. The trial court, having
jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter may have acted erroneously
but its judgment was not void, citing In re Ream, 54 Neb. 667, 75 N. W. 24.
"While there are decisions to the contrary, the weight of authority and the
better reasoning support the Nebraska rule."
VENUE
State v Shimmn et al 172 N. E. (Ohio) 367. Double jeopardy.
Defendants had transported liquor from Huron County to the adjoining
county of Sandusky. Later they were sentenced for the offense of transporting
liquor in Sandusky County. After the sentence, they were indicted for the
transportation in Huron County. A plea of double jeopardy was sustained by
the trial judge. Exceptions to the action of the trial judge were overruled by
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Jones, Robinson, Matthias and Allen, JJ., con-
curred. Marshall, C. J., Kinkade and Day, Ji., dissented. The dissenting
opinion states that the effect of the majority decision is that a "crime once
committed justifies the culprit in continuing his criminal processes indefinitely
so long as there is no interruption."
State v. Chdlikis (1930) 122 Ohio State 35, 170 N. E. 653. Crime committed
near county boundary line.
Defendant was convicted in Medina County, Ohio, for violation of a
liquor law in Summit County within one hundred rods of the line between
the counties. The conviction was obtained in Medina County under a statutory
provision permitting trial in either county, where the offense was committed
on the boundary line or within one hundred rods of the dividing line between the
two counties. The conviction was reversed and the statute was held invalid as
in contravention of the constitutional privilege of a trial "by an impartial
jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed".
The decision has been reviewed in the February number, 1931, of the Illinois
Law Review. The decision seems to condemn section 254 of chapter 10 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (proposed final draft) of the American Law
Institute.
